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Morrow v. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 69 (February 14, 2013)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE – PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE OF JUDGES
Summary
An original petition for a writ of mandamus from a district court order rejecting
petitioner’s peremptory challenge of a judge in a divorce action.
Disposition/Outcome
The ten day timeframe in which to file a peremptory challenge of a judge under SCR 48.1
commences with notice to the party of a hearing in the matter regardless of whether the party has
made an appearance. However, in accordance with NRCP 6(a), non-judicial days are not
counted as days within the ten day timeframe.
Facts and Procedural History
On April 18th, 2012, real party in interest Kourtney Morrow (hereinafter “Kourtney”)
filed a complaint for divorce from Craig and a motion for child custody with the Eight Judicial
District Court. Since the motion raised issues of temporary child custody, a hearing was set for
May 18, 2012, to be heard by the Honorable Robert Teuton. On April 20, 2012, Kourtney
properly served Craig Morrow (hereinafter “Craig”) with the summons, complaint, and motion.
On May 3, 2012, Craig retained counsel and on May 4, 2012, through counsel, made his first
appearance and filed a peremptory challenge against Judge Teuton. On May 8, 2012, the clerk
of the court reassigned the matter to the Honorable Cynthia Dianne Steel. On May 11, 2012,
Judge Steel issued an order rejecting the peremptory challenge and transferring the matter back
to Judge Teuton. In the order, Judge Steel determined that, according to SCR 48.1, the time to
file a peremptory challenge had expired on April 30, 2012, ten calendar days after Craig was
served notice. Craig then filed a writ petition challenging the order.
Discussion
The three-justice panel issued a per curiam opinion on the computation of allowable time
for filing a peremptory challenge, which was an issue of first impression.
Peremptory Challenge Rule
As a matter or right, each party in a district court civil action is entitled to peremptorily
challenge the judge assigned to the case before any hearing is commenced or any ruling is made
on a contested matter.2 Any such challenge must be made within ten days after notification to
the parties of a trial or hearing date.3
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Craig argued that the time to file a peremptory challenge cannot expire until a party has
made a first appearance. Kourtney argued that under the plain language of SCR 48.1 the time to
file a peremptory challenge may expire before a first appearance and therefore the District Court
properly rejected the challenge. While Craig argued that the summons giving him notice of the
hearing stated that he had twenty days to respond to the complaint, the Court held NRCP
12(a)(1), which provides a party twenty days to answer a complaint before a default judgment
may be issued, does not hold in abeyance all other required timelines. 4 Under the plain language
of the rule, the Court held that since Craig was properly served with notice of the hearing on
April 20, 2012, the ten day period of SCR 48.1(3)(a) commenced on that date.
The NRCP control the computation of time for SCR 48.1(3)
SCR 4 provides that if an act that is required to be done by a party falls on a non-judicial
day, the act must be performed on the next succeeding judicial day. 5 By contrast, NCRP 6(a)
expressly sets forth the method for computing time for any time limit prescribed by the NRCP,
local rules of a district court, orders of the court, or by any applicable statute.6 Kourtney argued
that SCR 4 operates to make NRCP 6(a) inapplicable. To resolve the issue the Court applied the
long standing rule of statutory interpretation that where two rules apply, they are to be
harmonized and read so as to give effect to both wherever possible.7 The Court held that SCR 4
and NCRP 6(a) are not in conflict since SCR 4 only deals with the situation where the final day
an act must be done falls on a non-judicial day whereas NRCP 6(a) deals with the computation
of time limits from beginning to end.
Since the NRCP govern the procedure in any civil action in a district court8 and SCR
48.1(1) specifically states that it is a procedure in a civil action in a district court9, the Court held
that SCR 48.1 falls within the ambit of the NRCP. NCRP 6(a) provides that, where a specified
time limit is eleven days or less, non-judicial days shall not be counted.10 Therefore, the Court
held that the District Court erred in failing to exclude non-judicial days from the ten day time
limit imposed by SCR 48.1.
Conclusion
The Court concluded that the peremptory challenge was properly filed and granted the
petition for mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order and reassign the case to
another judge. The Court held that while the plain language of SCR 48.1 requires a peremptory
challenge to be filed within ten days of receipt of a notice of hearing, NRCP 6(a)’s exclusion of
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non-judicial days from the computation of time for periods of eleven days or less applies. After
excluding the non-judicial days, Craig’s peremptory challenge was filed within the ten day
timeframe.

